RECENT CASES.
ALIEN ENEMY-AcQUISITION OF PROPERTY-TRADING WITH THE ENEMY

ACT.-The testatrix, an American citizen, died during the war, leaving onethird of her property, both real and personal, to an alien enemy, resident in
Germany. The residuary devisees and legatees, who were the same parties,
claimed that the disposition of the one-third share, being to an alien enemy, was
void, and hence that they themselves were entitled to it. Held: The devise was
good, and title vested in the alien enemy thereby. The Trading with the Enemy
Act is not applicable to devises, although by virtue of it the share was awarded

to the alien property custodian.

Gregg's Estate, 266 Pa. i89, io9 Atl. 777

(1920).

Until recent times, alien enemies had no rights whatever. I Blackstone
Comm. 372. The rule with respect to alien friends was the same in very early
times, so the gradual liberalization of the treatment of both classes of aliens may
well be traced together. It was first recognized that the encouragement of trade
required that alien friends should have the right to acquire personal property
in any way allowed to a citizen. Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. I, 17a (Eng., 1609).
The first concession to alien enemies, however, was more limited, recognizing
only the validity of bequests to them. Attorney-General v. Wheeden, Park.
267 (Eng. 1699); Crutcher v. Hord, 4 Bush 36o (Ky. 1868); In re Bang's Estate,
IOI N. Y. Misc. Rep. 495, 167 N. Y. S. 256 (1917). It was more than a century
later before an alien enemy was petnitted to take personal property by descent.
Bradwell v. Weeks, 13 John i (N. Y. 1815).
With regard to land, the disqualification of all aliens was complete. They
could not take by descent, and while they could acquire land by purchase, the
beneficial interest in such land was not in them, but in the Crown. Calvin's
Case, supra, 25a. In the United States the early rule mitigated the rigor of the
English doctrine. It was accepted law that an alien could not take by descent.
Jackson's Lessee v. Burns, 3 Binney 75 (Pa. 181o); Barzizas v. Hopkins, 2 Rand.
276 (Va. 1824); Montgomery v. Dorian, 7 N. H. 475 (1835). However, they
were permitted to take by purchase. Craig v. Radford, 3 Wheat. 594 (U. S.
81 8 ); Scanlan v. Wright, 13 Pick. 523 (Mass. 1833); Doe d. Rouche v. Williamson, 3 Iredell Law 141 (N. C. 1842). This early rule has been specifically applied
to alien enemies. Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch. 6o3 (U. S. 1813); Hoskins v.
Gentry, 2 Duval 285 (Ky. 1865).
The power to regulate the manner in which all aliens may hold property
has been held to belong to the states, subject to treaty provisions. Blythe v.
Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 21 Sup. Ct. 390 (igol). Accordingly, while some
states have adhered to the early rule, the majority have modified it by statute.
The Pennsylvania Act permits aliens to acquire lands either by devise or descent.
Act of 23 Feb. 1791, 3 Smith's Laws 4. While the right is not specifically given
to enemy aliens, they may be presumed to be included, since the only provision
of the act referring to them particularly is in the nature of an exception, subjecting their property to sequestration in time of war. The principal case shows
that such is the proper interpretation.
(176)
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The Trading with the Enemy Act was also held to be inapplicable to devises, inasmuch as the act is essentially commercial in character. Hence, despite the broad definition of "to trade" given in section 2 (d) of the act, it should
be construed as limited to dealings of a commercial nature. The acquisition of
property by descent or device clearly does not fall within that category. The
same view was taken in two later cases, the first of which also upheld the validity
of devises to alien enemies, under a statute similar to that of Pennsylvania. In
re Keilsmark's Will, 177 N. W. 69o (Iowa, 1920); Techt v. Hughes, 128 N. E.
185 (N. Y. 1920). Cases reaching the same conclusions on both points have also
been decided under the similar acts in the British dominions. In the Will of
Doig (i916) Victoria L. R. 698; Public Trustee v. Heidemann, (917) New
Zealand L. R. 633.
CRIMINAL LAw-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND BATTERY-IMPLIED MALICE.

-Defendant drove a motor truck along the streets of a city at a high rate of
speed in a manner which manifestly and necessarily imperiled the lives and
limbs of pedestrians. Held: Malice could be implied from the defendant's
acts so as to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault and battery. Commonwealth v. Coccodralli, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 324 (1920).
The section of the Pennsylvania statute under which the above case was
decided reads as follows: "If any person shall unlawfully and maliciously inflict
upon another person, either with or without any weapon or instrument any grievous bodily harm" such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Act of March
31, 186o, sec. 98; P. L. 407.
It is generally held that accidental injury without intent to inflict pain or
injury does not constitute a criminal assault and battery at Common Law.
Atkinson v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. 419, 138 S. W. 125 -(911); McGee v. State, 4
Ala. App. 54, 58 So. 1oo8 (1912); but see Clark's Criminal Law (3rd Ed.) p.
262. However an intent to injure may be inferred from an act which is in itself
unlawful; State v. Hemphill, 162 N. C. 632, 78 S. E. 167 (1913); Clark's
Criminal Law (3rd Ed.) page 52; or an act which though lawful in its inception
is performed in'an unreasonable and unjustifiable manner. Com. v. Gayton,
69 Pa. Super. Ct. 573 (1918). But mere lack of ordinary care is not sufficient
to imply intent. Luther v. State, 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640 (1912). Where
an act done in the commission of another crime results in an assault and battery
the intent may be carried over where the original act is malum in se; McGehnee
v. State, 62 Miss. 772 (x885); State v. Costa, 11o Atl. 875 (Conn. 1920); and not
merely malum prohibilum; Luther v. State supra; Com. v. Adams, 114 Mass.
323 (1873); but the latter has been doubted. State v. Stanton, 37 Conn. 421
(1870); Fishwick v. State, 33 Ohio C. C. 63; r4 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 368 (i9ii).
Although malice is not an essential element of assault and battery at common law, it may be made so by statute, and the malice required may be inferred
from the doing of a willful act, the natural and probable consequences of which
is to endanger the lives of others. Smith v. Com., ioo Pa. 324 (1882); State v.
Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 Atl. 112 (1915); affirmed in 88 N. J. L. 396, 96 Atl.
659 (i916). The term "malicious" has no definite meaning in the law; Bishop's
New Cr. Law (8th Ed.) 1892, sec. 427-2; and therefore each case arising under
the above statute must of necessity be decided on its own facts. It seems that
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the court in the principal case was justified in holding that malice could be implied where the jury found the defendant's acts necessarily imperiled the lives
of other persons, especial emphasis being laid on the fact that the reckless driving occurred on a city street. Cf. State v. Schutte, supra, which is the only
-case found implying malice from reckless driving in a city street.
It is interesting to note that under similar facts where the injury resulted
in death there have been numerous convictions for manslaughter; People v.
Darragh, 141 App. Div. 4o8, 126 N. Y. S. 522 (1910); Schultz v. State 89 Neb.
34, 13o N. W. 972 (i911); Note 3o L. R. A. (N. S.) 458; but none for murder
in the first degree. It is submitted that there is no difference in principle between this case and the classical illustration of implying malice so as to sustain
a conviction of murder in the first degree where the defendant has recklessly
thrown a log from a roof into a crowded street, striking and killing a passerby.
Clark, Criminal Law (3rd Ed.) page 211. But it is evident from the manslaughter
cases noted above that juries are unwilling to imply malice from reckless driving
when it means that their verdict must be murder.
DAmAGES-OMIsSION OF NOMINAL DAmAGES IN VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF.

-In an action of trespass for the interference with the use of an easement, the
jury returned a verdict generally for the plaintiff but failed to assess any damages. The defendant appeals, assigning as error the entry of judgment on such
a verdict. Held: that the failure to assess damages in the verdict was not
error. S. Austin Bicking Manufacturing Co. v. Worrall, 74 Pa. Super. Ct.
242 (1920).

"Nominal damages mean no damages at all. They exist only in name
and not in amount. In the quaint saying of an old writer they are a mere peg
to hang costs on."

Stanton v. N.Y. and E. Ry., 59 Conn. 272,22 Atl. 300 (189o).

The importance therefore of the principle of nominal damages is its effect upon
the costs, which are a matter of statute in practically every jurisdiction at the
present time. As a general rule where the action is brought to prevent trespasses, to try titles to land, or to determine rights of any kind, the party in the
wrong bears the costs. But in all other cases where damage is of the essence
of the action, nominal damages with costs cannot be awarded. Sedgwick on
Damages, 9th Ed., Vol. I, secs. 96-1o8.
In Allen v. Flock, 2 P. & W. 159 (Pa. 183 o ) the court says that "where
damages or costs, or both, ought to be assessed, if the jury fail to assess either,
the plaintiff may still make the verdict good by releasing his right to either or
both." In the principal case therefore the plaintiff alone had the right to object
to the failure to find nominal damages, and since he had waived that right by
accepting the verdict, the entry of judgment thereon was without error and the
defendant cannot object thereto.
A new trial will not be granted upon the sole ground that the plaintiff is
entitled to nominal damages, East Moline Co. v. Weir Plow Co., 95 Fed. 250
(1899); Boardman v. Marshalltown Grocery Co., O5 Iowa 445, 75 N. W. 343
(1898); but a new trial will be granted if nominal damages would have carried
with it costs, East Moline Co. v. Weir Plow Co., supra; Wyatt v. Herring, go
Mich. 58I, 5I N. W. 684 (1892). A motion for a compulsory nonsuit will be
denied where the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages. Hancock v. Hubbell,
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71 Cal. 537 (1887); Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432 (1857). Where also a judgment is reversed because a judgment for nominal damages and costs should
have been awarded, instead of granting a new trial the court will order judgment
to be entered for the plaintiff for nominal damages and costs. Jones v. Telegraph Co., ioi Tenn. 442,.47 S. W. 699 (1898); Segelke v. Finan, 48 Hun 310(N. Y. 1888).
EVIDENcE-ADMISSIBILITY OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS TO FORMER TA..

CONTAINING TESTIMONY OF ILL WITNES.-In the second trial of the accused for,
murder, a physician testified that one of the witnesses for the State was ill and
would not be able to appear in court for at least two weeks. The testimony of
the absent witness as contained in the bill of exceptions taken at the previous
trial was then read in evidence, a statute providing that this could be done when
"it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that any evidence
used at the former trial cannot be had." Held: it was not error to admit the
evidence. Blackwell v. State, 86 So. 224 (Fla. 1920).
In many jurisdictions illness is not sufficient ground for unavailability to
allow a witness' testimony given in a previous trial of the same case to be admitted. He must be dead, insane, out of the jurisdiction, or absent by the
procurement of the accused to bring the testimony within the exception to thehearsay rule. State v. Staples, 47 N. H. 113 (1866); Com. v. McKenna, i58
Mass. 207, 33 N. E. 389 (1893); State v. Rogers, ioi S. C. 28o, 85 S. E. 638
(1915). Of those jurisdictions which regard illness as sufficient, the great majority require the sickness to be of a permanent character. Such testimony will be
admitted "when, from the nature of the illness or other infirmity, no reasonable
hope remains that the witness will be able to appear in court on any future occasion."
I Greenl. Ev. 163; and Berney v. Mitchell, 34 N. J. L. 337 (1870);
Spencer v. State, 132 Wis. 509, 112 N. W. 462 (1907); McCrorey v. Garrett, iog9
Va. 645, 64 S. E. 978 (I909); Neal v. Leather Works, i98 Mich. 598, i65 N. W.
681 (1917). If any distinction is drawn in this rule between civil and criminal
cases the rule is stricter in the latter. State v. Staples, supra; Whitaker v.
Marsh, 62 N. H. 477 (1883).
In Pennsylvania it is well settled that in a civil case the testimony of an
ill witness as given in a former trial where the parties and issue were the same
may be admitted, the degree of illness necessary to admission resting entirely
with the discretion of the court. Emig v. Diehl, 76 Pa. 359 (1873), where witness had weakened mentally since the former trial; Rothrock v. Gallaher, 91
Pa. io8 (1879), where witness' memory had failed; Thornton v. Britton, z44
Pa. 126, 22 Atl. io48 (i89i), where witness was infirm and confined to his room;
Perrin v. Wells, x55 Pa. 299, 26 Atl. 543 (893), where witness was too ill to
attend court; and Knights of Pythias v. Leadbeter, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 461 (1896),
where witness was unable to be present by reason of illness. The question has.
never been decided in a criminal case in Pennsylvania. In McLain v. Com.,
99 Pa. 86 (x88i), the court intimated that the former testimony of a witness who
was temporarily ill would be excluded, but decided the case on another point.
The principal objections to the admission of the former testimony of a
witness who is temporarily ill are: it marks an extension of the exception to the
hearsay rule, which courts should restrict rather than extend; the accuracy of
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the testimony is dependent upon the memory of the witness who heard the
original testimony; and in a criminal case, the constitutional right of confrontation is infringed. On the other hand, it may be questioned whether the evidence
is hearsay at all. The testimony was given in a former trial under oath and
subject to cross examination. Now that the use of stenographic notes has
become practically universal the original testimony is not likely to be misquoted.
It is taken down verbatim and preserved in the official record. The accused in
a criminal case cannot object that he has been denied the right of confronting his
accuser, for he has had this right in the previous trial. In fact, there is even
more reason to admit such testimony in a criminal than in a civil case. If an
important witness be taken suddenly ill in a civil-case after the trial has begun,
the case may be continued; but if it is a criminal case, the state cannot demand
a continuance because of the double jeopardy rule. The provision in the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act which allows the Compensation Board
in a hearing de novo to use as much of the testimony taken at the former hearing
as they see fit is only one of the recent statutes which recognize the desirability
of the more liberal use of testimony taken at the previous trial.
EVIDENCE-CORROBORATION By CUmULATIvE EVIDENCE.-A statute required the mother's testimony in bastardy proceedings to be corroborated in
some rpaterial particular by other evidence. The plaintiff was a servant and
housekeeper for the defendant. She testified that he was the father of her
child, and relied upon the following facts as corroboration: (i) that the defendant sent for a doctor at the time of the child's birth; (2) that he allowed the
plaintiff and her child to remain in the house for several weeks after the child's
birth; (3) that he did not ask her during that time who was the father of her
child; (4) that he did not answer a letter in which she wrote, "You know the
child is yours;" (5) the demeanor of the witnesses. The Divisional Court held
that there was sufficient corroboration of the plaintiff's testimony. It ruled
that while each fact may, by itself, be insufficient as corroboration, the cumulative effect of the evidence, regarded not separately but collectively, may be, and
in this case is sufficient corroboration. The Court of Appeal held that none of
these matters amounted to evidence corroborating the plaintiff's testimony in
a material particular, whether considered separately or collectively. It criticised
the suggestion that facts not corroboration when considered separately could be
such when considered collectively. Thomas v. Jones, 36 T. L. R. 872 (Eng. 1920).
American authority on this point is scant, mainly because, no doubt, of
the hesitancy of our courts to define such terms as "corroboration" by detailed
rules of law. Whether there exists such corroborative evidence is a question
for the determination of the trial judge upon the circumstances of each case.
However there seems to be no reason why facts may not amount to corroboration when taken together, even if, considered separately, they would be insufficient. It is a matter of adding not ciphers, but fractions. Each fact in itself
may tend to corroborate without amounting to corroboration; and all the facts,
taken together, may thus amount to sufficient corroboration.

EVIDENCE-INADMISSIBILITY OF PAST CRIMs-ExcEPTO.s.-The defendant, manager of a shoe factory engaged on a government contract, was
indicted with others for conspiring to defraud the government. It was alleged
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that the defendant secured false government inspector stamps and fraudulently
,caused inferior leather to be stamped as inspected and passed. Evidence was
admitted tending to show that shortly previous, the defendant had corruptly
bribed a government inspector on another contract. Held: It was error to have
admitted this evidence. The fact in issue was whether the defendant had secured
the use of these stamps in the factory. Therefore the evidence was not admissible under any of the-exceptions to the general rule as to the inadmissibility in
evidence of other and past crimes. McDonald v. U. S., 264 Fed. 733 (1920).
In a case decided by the same court shortly before, the defendant was
indicted for defrauding the government by putting inferior outer and inner soles
in shoes on a government contract. Evidence was admitted that inferior slit
middle soles were also used on the same contract with the defendant's knowledge
and consent as bearing upon the defendant's intent. Sears v. U. S., 264 Fed.
257 (1920).

The general rule of criminal evidence is that proof of a distinct, independ-ent crime is inadmissible. To this rule there are several well-known exceptions
.one of which is that it may be introduced to prove intent or motive. Com. v.
Wilson, 186 Pa. I, 4o Atl. 283 (1898); Statev. O'Donnell, 36 Ore, 222.61 Pac. 892
(19oo); People v. Ascher, 126 Mich. 637, 86 N. W. 140 (igoi). This rule with
its exceptions, though easily defined is very difficult of application.
In the principal case the fact in issue was whether the defendant had committed the act. The evidence was therefore properly rejected. In such a
case the evidence would show only a tendency on the part of the defendant to
-commit the act. It would not prove nor tend to prove the act to have been the
defendant's. State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 24 Am. Rep. 69 (1876); Fish v.
U. S., 215 Fed. 544, 132 C. C. A. 56 (1914); People v. Molineux, I68 N. Y. 264,
.61 N. E. 286 (I90I).

In Sears v. U. S. supra, however, the act was admitted. The question
was with what intent the soles had been put into the shoes. The evidence therefore of other corrupt practices in the same contract had a direct bearing upon
the defendant's motive or intent, in doing the act for which he was indicted.
The evidence was therefore properly admitted. People v. Harris, 136 N. Y.
423, 33 N. E. 65 (1893); Moore v. U. S., 150 U. S. 57, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26 (1893);
Caldwell v. U. S., 256 Fed. 805, 168 C. C. A. 151 (1919).
It is submitted that the two cases, McDonald v. U. S., supra and Sears v.
-U. S., supra,though apparently in conflict, are in harmony with one another and
with the accepted rules of evidence. Decisions in general, however, are by no
means in harmony. This is not due to the uncertainty of the rule or its exceptions, but to the great difficulty of applying them to the facts in issue. For a
very valuable discussion of the whole subject see note in 62 L. R. A. 193HUSBAND

AND

WIFE-COMMUNITY

PROPERTY-RIGHTS

OF PUTATIVE

WiE.-The plaintiff in good faith married the defendant while her first husband
was living. Held: As putative wife, she is entitled to a community interest in
the property acquired jointly after the marriage. Schneider v. Schneider, 191
Pac. 533 (Cal. 1920).
A void marriage confers no rights upon either party in respect to the
-property of the other owned prior to the marriage or acquired separately there-
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after. Price v. Price, 124 N. Y. 589 (1891), 27 N. E. 383, 12 L. R. A. 359
The authorities are divided, however, as to the rights of the wife of a void marriage to property acquired by the joint efforts of herself and husband during their
cohabitation. In the majority of jurisdictions, where the common-law right of
dower exists, it is generally held that a woman, in order to be entitled to dower,
must base her claim upon a legal marriage. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2 Dana IO3
26 Am. Dec. 437, (Ky. 1834); Barfield v. Barfield, 139 Ala. 290 35 So. 884,
(x9o3). In those states, the broad rule has been laid down that where a woman
in good faith marries and lives with a man who has a wife living, the marriage
is ipso facto void, and the woman, by virtue of such marriage, acquires no rights
in the man's estate upon his death. Kennelly v. Cowle, 6 Ohio S. & C. P1.
Dec. 170 (897).

This doctrine does not prevail, however, where the community property
theory has been followed. In Louisiana, Texas, California, and Washington,
it is generally held that a "putative" wife, or the wife of a void marriage, is
entitled to the community property rights accorded a lawful wife in the property
acquired during the marriage by their joint labors. Morgan v. Morgan, I Tex.
Civ. App. 315, 21 S. W. 154 (1892); Coats v. Coats, 16o Cal. 671, 118, Pac.
441 (I9II). While the common law prevails in all these jurisdictions except
Louisiana, their courts have in this instance disregarded it and followed the civillaw rule in regard to the property rights of husband and wife. They base their
decision on equitable grounds, stating that where persons, believing themselves
lawfully married to each other, acquire property as the result of their joint
efforts, they have impliedly adopted the rule of an equal division of their acquisitions.
LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-COVENANT

NOT

TO ASSIGN

LEAsE-BANK-

RuPTc.-The bankrupt was lessee under a lease which contained a clause prohibiting assignment without the lessor's consent. The receiver in bankruptcy
moved for an order confirming the sale of the lease. The motion was granted.
In re Prudential Lithograph Co., 265 Fed. 869 (1920).
The court reasoned that the lease passed by operation of law, not by any
act on the part of the lessee, and that therefore there was no breach of the lessee's
covenant not to assign. This view represents the great weight of authority.
In re Riggs, (1901) 2 K. B. i6; In re Bush, 126 Fed. 878 (I9O4). The contrary
view is taken in In re Breck, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 1822, 8 Ben. 93, (1875), but the
case dismisses the question briefly, without any reasoning, and is therefore of
little weight. Other kinds of transfer by operation of law have also been held
not to be a breach of the lessee's covenant not to assign, as by sale under execution, Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 12 Am. St. Rep. 174 (1889), even where the
judgment was confessed by the lessee. Jackson v. Corliss, 7 Johns 531 (N. Y.
i8n). Where, however, the tenant gave a warrant of attorney to confess judgment to a creditor for the express purpose of enabling the creditor to take the
lease in execution under the judgment, it was held the covenant was broken.
Doe v. Carter, 8 T. R. 30o (Eng. 1799). So any collussion or fraud by the
lessee in obtaining the transfer by operation of law makes the passing of the
lease voluntary and hence within the prohibiting clause. Doe v. Hawke, 2
East. 481 (1802); Jackson v. Silvernail, i5 Johns 277 (N. Y. 1818). A volun-
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tary assignment for the benefit of creditors is not a transfer by operation of law,
and therefore is a breach of the covenant. The Medinah Temple Co. v.
Currey, 162 Ill. 441, 44 N. E. 839 (1896).

A clause prohibiting assignment, broad enough to cover transfer by operation of law, is valid; Davis v. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154 (Eng. I83O); Doe v. Hawke,
supra; or if the continuance of the term is made to depend upon the lessee's
actual occupation of the premises, any transfer, voluntary or involuntary, which
puts the lessee out of possession cancels the lease. Doe v. Clarke, 8 East. 185
(Eng. 1807).

The principal case is an instance of the application of the rule that such
clauses are to be strictly construed against the lessor. The rule is based on the
belief that it is inequitable for the lessor to refuse his consent to an assignment,
unless he has a valid objection to the assignee. A possible view of these cases,
which seems to have been overlooked or disregarded, is that when a lessor inserts the ordinary clause prohibiting assignment, he intends to make the lease
absolutely non-assignable, and believes he has done so. It may be that, for
some good reason, he would have granted the particular lease only to the original lessee. The construction, then, which permits assignment by operation of
law is against the intention of the contracting parties.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-OccuPANcY OF DWELLING INCIDENTAL TO EmPLOYMENT.-The plaintiff agreed to manage the defendant's farm in considera-

tion of a certain monthly wage and stipulated produce of the farm. It was also
agreed that the plaintiff should occupy the farm house as his dwelling. The
defendant notified the plaintiff that his services were no longer required. Upon
the plaintiff's faiiure to leave the premises, the defendant entered and forcibly
ejected him. Held: The plaintiff could not recover under a statute of forcible entry
and detainer, since he occupied the house as a necessary incident to his employment and the actual possession was in the defendant. Davis v. Long, 178 N.
W. 936 (N. D. 1920).
The common law rule, which is in force in many American jurisdictions, is
that a tenant holding over after the expiration of his term is a mere trespasser and
the landlord may use sufficient force to eject him and obtain possession of the
premises. Sterling v. Ward, 51 N. H. 217, 12 Am. Rep. 8o (1871); Todd v.
Jackson, 26 N. J. L. 525 (1857).
Under statutes of forcible entry and detainer many states permit a recovery
to the tenant who has been forcibly ejected by the landlord after the expiration
of his term. Reeder v. Purdy, 41 Il1. 279 (1866); Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn.
12 (1884). The theory upon which a person is permitted recovery under these
statutes is that a man should be protected in the actual and peaceable possession of his home. A man's home is his castle and even though the landlord had
the right to possession he had no right to take the law into his own hands to
obtain it. Spencer v. Commercial Co., 30 Wash. 520, 71 Pac. 55 (1902). The
action tries neither the title nor even the right to possession. The only question
is whether the plaintiff has been forcibly dispossessed from a peaceable possession.
All that is necessary to sustain the action is the complainant's actual possession
and his forcible dispossession thereof by the defendant. Hammond v. Doty,
184 Ill. 246, 56 N. E. 371 (i9oo); Milner v. Wilson, 45 Ala. 478 (1871). Since
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the gist of the action is to protect a peaceable possession, some courts have held
that even a trespasser has his remedy for forcible dispossession by the owner.
Harris v. Turner, 46 Mo. 438 (1870).
But where one occupies a dwelling house incidental to his employment,
his occupancy is generally considered that of a servant rather than that of a
tenant. Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala. 530, 30 So. 488 (19oo); Mackenzie v.
Minis, 132 Ga. 323, 63 S. E. 900 (19o9). The possession is in the master, the
servant having no distinct possessory rights therein. Kerrains v. People, 6o
N. Y. 221, 19 Am. Rep. 158 (1875); Bowman v. Bradley, 151 Pa. 351, 24 Atl.
1o62 (1892). Therefore when the contract of hiring is terminated the servant's
right of occupancy is also terminated, since it cannot survive the hiring to which
it is a necessary incident. Chatard v. O'Donovan, 8o Ind. 20, 41 Am. Rep.
782

(1881).

In the principal case the court took the view that the plaintiff occupied
the premises as a servant. The defendant had more than a mere right to possession. The possession was actually in him and therefore the plaintiff, not being
dispossessed of an actual and peaceable possession, could not maintain his
action.
PRACTicE-PENNSYLVANA

ACT

OF

1915-AFFIDAVIT

OF

DEFENSE-

SPECIFIC DENIAL.-Held: A denial "for the purpose of the affidavit of defense"

and a demand of proof, coupled with an admission of ignorance as to the exact
facts is not a "specific denial" as required by the Pennsylvania Practice Act of
1915. Warfel v. Burkholder, 29 Pa. Dist. Rep. 939 (1920).
Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Practice Act of I915, P. L. 483, under which
the above case was decided reads as follows: "Every allegation of fact in the
plaintiff's statement of claim . . . if not denied specifically or by necessary
implication in the affidavit of defense . . . shall be taken to be admitted
As the Practice Act does not define what will constitute a specific denial,
the question must of necessity be determined as the cases arise. One Common
Pleas Court has attempted to supplement the Act by a rule stating what shall
constitute a "specific denial." Brinker & Co. v. Shimer, 29 Pa. Dist. Rep. 44o
(1920).
But it is submitted that such a rule is invalid unless it agrees with the
interpretation upon this clause by the court of last resort.
The decisions under this section of the Practice Act are surprisingly uniform although practically all of the cases have been decided by courts of first
instance. This indicates that there is a well defined idea in the minds of the
Judiciary as to the proper interpretation of this clause. Thus it has been held
that an evasive denial will amount to an admission; Bankers-Commercial
Security Co. v. Greer, 29 Pa. Dist. Rep. 495 (1920); as will an averment which
neither admits nor denies the averment in the statement of claim. Herron v.
Florence Presbyterian Church, 27 Pa. Dist. Rep. 1025 (1918). So a denial
conditioned on the truth or falsity of collateral averments is insufficient; Penna.
Rys. Adv. Co. v. Warneck, 49 Pa. C. C. 81 (1920); as is a general denial. Fulton Farmer's Assn. v. Bamberger, 34 Lanc. 325 (Pa. 1917), affirmed in 262 Pa.
43 (1918). An averment that neither admits nor denies the allegation in the
statement of claim but demands proof, will amount to an admission; Freidburg
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v. Seehermann, 27 Pa. Dist, Rep. 972 (1918), as will an averment of ignorance
-of the facts in the plaintiff's allegation and a demand of proof. Eberbach v.
Clyde Steamship Co., 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 79 (1920). There is dictum, however,
-to the effect that an averment by the defendant of lack of knowledge of the
facts alleged by the plaintiff and a demand of proof is equivalent to a specific
denial of the allegation in the statement of claim. Beck v. Kaufman, 26 Pa.
Dist. Rep. I (1916), following Carnell v. Gorson, 25 Pa. Dist. Rep. 189 (1916)
and Penna. R. R. v. Dreifus, 25 Pa. Dist. Rep. 265 (1916) which cases were
decided prior to the Practice Act of 1915 under Philadelphia rule of Court No.
59 which was worded substantially the same as the present section. See also
American Building Assn. v. Dunlap, 30 Lanc. 59 (Pa. 19O1). However an averment of lack of knowledge and demand of proof will not amount to a specific
denial if the pleadings show that the defendant had means of ascertaining the
facts. Bowen v. Fuhrmann, 28 Pa. Dist. Rep. 717 (1919). For an exhaustive
discussion of "specific denials" see articles by David Werner Amram in 64
U. of P. Law Rev. 223 at 247; 65 U. of P. Law Rev. 424 at 435; 66 U. of P.
Law Rev. 195 at 203.
The principal case goes even further than any previous decision and shows
the purpose of the Judiciary to uphold the very letter of the Act. It is submitted
that the courts are justified in the view they have taken, for the purpose of the
Act is to bring the case to an issue and final conclusion with the least possible
delay. A strict interpretation of the statute will compel the defendant to ascertain the exact status of his case by a diligent investigation before trial. If the
defendant has no defense the plaintiff can properly obtain judgment without
trial and thus avoid delaying the trial of other causes. The defendant is still
protected, for if he can satisfy the court that he has no knowledge or means of
knowledge of the facts alleged by the plaintiff he may go on to trial. This
practice tends to promote a speedy and satisfactory administration of justice
which is after all the aim of all procedural statutes.
P uNciP~A

AND

AGENT-INDEumTY-SPEcIAL

DAMAGES-PROXIMATE

CAusE.-The plaintiff sent a letter libellous of third persons to the defendant,
his agent. The defendant negligently dropped the letter in the office of the
-company where the libelled persons were employed. Another employee, one
Hurst, found the letter and communicated its contents to the persons libelled,
who recovered substantial punitive damages from the plaintiff. The plaintiff
now sues his agent, and claims special damages for the loss resulting from the
suit for libel. Held: The plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only. WeldBlundell v. Stephens, 36 T. L. R. 640 (Eng. 1920).
At the trial in the lower court the plaintiff was refused special damages
-on the ground that he could not demand contribution toward a loss the root of
which was his own wrong. Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, (1919) 1 K. B. 520.
This reasoning is affirmed on appeal, but the House of Lords attempts to establish another ground for the decision, which perhaps implies a lack of confidence
in the one given by the court of the King's Bench, discussed in 68 U. of P. Law
Rev. 194. The further reason advanced is that Hurst's wrongful act, in reading
the letter and communicating its contents to the persons libelled, was the act
-of an independent, intervening agent, and as such prevents the defendant's
.negligence from being the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
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Admitting that Hurst's act was wrongful, this fact alone, under the English decisions, would not be sufficient to break the legal chain of causation.
Burrows v. The March Gas and Coke Co., L. R. (1872) 7 Ex. 96; Clark v. Chambers, L. R. (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 327; Engelhart v. Farrant, L. R. (1897) I Q. B. D.
240; De la Bere v. Pearson, L. R. (1907) I K. B. 483, (1908) I K. B. 28o; Hughes
v. Bailey, 36 T. L. R. 398 (920).
It is interesting to note that in general the
decisions in the United States take the opposite view. Hullinger v. Worrell,
83 Ill. 220 (1876); Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S. E. 300 (I9OI); Bollinger
v. Rader, 15I N. C. 383, 66 S. E. 314 (1909); 153 N. C. 488, 69 S. E. 497 (1910);
contra, Brower v. New York Central and Hudson River R. R. Co., 91 N. J. L.
19o, IO3 AtI. 166 (I918). If the wrongful qiiality of Hurst's act is immaterial,
as we have seen it is under the English decisions, in what other respects can
his act be looked upon as an insulating medium between the defendant's negligent breach of duty and the injury to the plaintiff? An act negligent toward a.
person is none the less the proximate cause of a resulting injury to that person
because it was translated into damage by the act of a third person, especially
when the act of the third person was probable under the circumstances. Collinsv. The Middle Level Commissioners, L. R. (1869) 4 C. P. 279; Clark v. Chambers, supra; Calvin v. The Mayor of New York, 112 N. Y. Atpp. 223, I9 N. E.
675 (1889). It was natural and probable that, if Hurst was given an opportunity to dicover the contents of the letter, he would do so and would communicate them to his business associates. His reaction was practically that of an
automaton. It might even be regarded as a rightful act, a duty, especially
since the libel concerned the men in their official relation to the company. Taking this view of the facts, his communication of the libel to them approaches a
privileged situation, to which the principle stated in Derry v. Handley, 16 L. T.
R. 263 (1867), applies rather than that in Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East I (I8O6).
In short, the additional ground advanced by the House of Lords adds little,
if anything, to the persuasive power of the decision.
PRACTICE-PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE ACT OF igI5-NOT APPLICABLE TO
APPEALS FROM JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.-The plaintiff in an action of contract
instituted before a justice of the peace appealed to the Court of Common Pleas.
He did not file a statement of claim, but declared on the transcript of the record.
The defendant moved to have the appeal dismissed, alleging that the plaintiff
had not complied with the provisions of the Practice Act of May 14, 1915, P. L.
483. The motion was overruled. On appeal to the Superior Court, Held, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover, since the Practice Act does not apply to cases of
appeals from the courts of justices of the peace. Maiorana v. Sacchetti, 73 Pa.
Super Ct. 5io (1920).
The decision of the Superior Court settles a question that has agitated thecourts of the several counties since the passage of the Practice Act. The courts
of Cumberland, Green, Northampton and Potter Counties have held in accord
with the instant case. Kapp v. Henry, 29 Pa. Dist. Rep. 120 (1920); Cowan v.
Blair, 65 Pitts. 702 (Pa. 1917); Maiorana v. Sacchetti, supra; Miller& Co. v..
Satterly, 27 Pa. Disi. Rep. 338 (1917). The courts of Berks, Lancaster and
Washington Counties have held contra. Lincoln v. Reading Electric Co. 9.
Berks 133 (Pa. 1917); Ege v. Arnold, io Berks, 177 (Pa. 1918), 27 Pa. Dist. Rep..
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-974; Strickler v. Barton, 34 Lanc. 1i6 (Pa. 1917); Ankney v. Eby, 27 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 571 (1917); Wheeling Mattress Co. v. Cockins, 15 Just. L. R.ioi (Pa. 1916).

In Schuylkill County, decisions have been reported both ways. Richey v.
Maurer, 12 Schuylkill 27, 26 Pa. Dist. Rep. 832 (1916); Rosenblum v. Block, 14
Schuylkill 27, 27 Pa. Dist. Rep. 685 (1917); Ryan v. American Express Co.
14 Schuylkill 249 (Pa. 1918). In all of the above cited cases the courts were considering the question in the absence of any rules of court applying the Practice
-Act to such appeals. In the counties of Cumberland, Luzerne, Philadelphia,
Erie and Somerset, rules of Court have been made applying the Act to these
-appeals.
The decision of the Superior Court in the principal case is sound as a mere
matter of dealing with the words of the Act. Section I provides inter aliasthat
the Act shall apply "in actions of assumpsit and trespass, except actions for libel
,and slander, brought in any court of common pleas." The proposition presented
to the court was, is an action based on a transcript of the record of the proceedings before the justice of the peace and filed with the prothonotary of the common
pleas court in accordance with the act of Mar. 20, I8io, 5 Sm. 164, an action
-"brought in" the common pleas? The Superior court declared that the words
"brought in" are equivalent to "instituted in or begun in," and since a suit
is brought when it is commenced, it cannot be "brought in" a court of the justice
of the peace and again when it is appealed to the common pleas. It is the same
cause of action even though the case is tried de novo. Deihm v. Snell, ii9 Pa.
Z16 (1888). Since the case has been "brought in" the court of the justice of
the peace and has not been "brought in" the common pleas, the Practice Act
by its very words does not extend to such appeals. Cf. Meredith v. Ferguson,
19 Pa. C. C. I9O (1897) where for other and more cogent reasons, the Act of May
25, 1887, P. L. 271 was held not to be appliacble to these appeals.
Any difficulties which the decision raises, may unquestionably be obviated
by the adoption of rules of court applying the provisions of the Practice Act to
-appeals brought to the common pleas from the courts of the justices of the peace.
By the Acts of June i6, 1836, P. L. 792 and May 24, x878, P. L. 135 each court
.is empowered to establish rules of practice, provided they are not in conflict with
the constitution or laws of the commonwealth. As there is no act of the assembly
.or constitutional provision governing the procedure on such appeals other than
that the transcript of the record of the proceedings before the justice of the peace
shall be flied with the prothonotary of the proper court of common pleas, the rules
,of court extending the Practice Act to cover these appeals are of unquestioned
validity.
QUASI CONTRAT-WILFUL BREACH OF CONTRACT.-The plaintiff agreed
-to ive with and care for the defendant and his wife until their death and to keep
,the defendant's farm in good repair. In consideration thereof the defendant
-undertook to convey the farm to the plaintiff. The plaintiff abandoned the
contract after eight years service and brought this action for value of work and
'labor done. Held: That he could recover for the reasonable value of his services. Humphrey v. Johnson, 127 N. E. 819 (Ind. 1920).
Where one is under contract to do a definite amount of work, as to erect
,or repair a building, and in good faith endeavors to perform, it is generally held
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that he can recover if. there has been a substantial performance on his part..
Keeler v. Herr, 157 Ill. 57, 41 N. E. 750 (1895); Eiliott v. Caldwell, 43 Minn.
357, 45 N. W. 845 (189o). In most jurisdictions the action is brought on the.
contract, the measure of damages being the contract price, less damages resulting to the defendant from the plaintiff's breach. 2 W. & S. 58 (Pa. 1841).
Some jurisdictions however, require that a quasi contractual action of assumpsit
be brought. Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Dick. 181 (Mass. 1828).
Even if the performance has been seriously incomplete the contractor
will in some states be permitted to recover in quasi contract, provided he has.
acted in good faith. 121 Mich. 444, 8o N. W. 292 (1899); Dermott v. Jones
27 How. 220 (U. S. 1859).
But if the contractor has wilfully abandoned hiscontract the prevailing ruie is that he cannot recover either on the contract itself or in quasi contract. Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, io6 Minn. 202, 118 N. W.
797 (I9O8); Maxwell v. Delahomme, 163 Ala. 49o, 5o So. 882 (I9O9). This ruleis held to apply in many states where there is an employment contract and the
employee wilfully abandons his employment. Hoffstetter v. Gash, 1O4 Ill.
App. 455 (19o2); Henderson v. Stiles, 14 Ga. 135 (1853). However, in a numberof jurisdictions the employee who wilfully breaks his contract of service is permitted to recover in quasi contract. Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481 (1834)Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99 (1878). A few courts have even held that
there can be a recovery in quasi contract where one has wilfully abandoned a
building contract or a contract calling for a definite amount of work. McKinney
v. Springer, 3 Ind. 59 (1851); McClay v. Hedge, I8 Iowa 66 (1851).
A distinction is made by some courts between a contract calling for a
definite amount of work and one requiring the performance of certain services.
Where there has been a wilful breach of the former no recovery is granted.
Kelly v. Town of Bradford, 33 Vt. 35 (186o) semble. But it is held that a wilfut
breach of the latter will not bar recovery where the services are capable of ap-portionment. Booth v. Tyson, 15 Vt. 515 (1843).
The importance of the principal case lies in its treatment. The court
emphasized the peculiarly personal character of the work and considered the
plaintiff in like position with an employee under contract of service. Its conclusion was in no way based on its previous decisions permitting recovery toone who had wilfully abandoned a contract calling for a definite amount of
work. The natural implication is that the court favored the rule in force in
those jurisdictions where recovery is permitted in quasi contract when there is a
wilful breach of a contract of service, but is refused when there is such breach
of a building and similar contract.
SURETYSHIP-UNAUTHORIZED EXTENSION OF TIME A COMPLETE RELEASE..

-The defendants were mortgagors of land which they sold to one Peters. Upon
the maturity of the mortgage the plaintiff, the mortgagee, made an agreement
with Peters to extend the time of payment, without the knowledge or consent
of the defendants. Held: Under the California Code the unauthorized extension
of time completely releases the defendant from all liability as surety. Braun
v. Crew, 192 Pac. 531 (Cal. 1920).
Where land is sold subject to mortgage, as in the principal case, the land
becomes, as regards the mortgage, the principal debtor and the mortgagor, the-
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surety. Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 616 (1884); Crisman v. Manterman,
x49 Cal. 651, 87 Pac. 89 (I9O6). The defendant, therefore, in the principal
case stands in the relation of surety to the mortgage.
It is the general rule that an extension of the time of payment without the
consent of the surety, by a binding agreement between the creditor and the

principal debtor, absolutely releases the surety from all liability. Ardery's
Admrs., 36 Pa. 449 (i86o); Fales v. McDonald, 32 R. I. 406, 79 Atl. 969 (1911).
In Coyle v. Davis, 20 Wis. 56s (1866), it was held that the general rule as to an
extension of time releasing the surety applied to the case of a mortgagor standing as surety. In the principal case a like decision was reached.
The New York courts, however, hold that such an unauthorized extension
only releases the mortgagor, as surety, to the extent and amount that he was
injured thereby. Murray v. Marshall, suPra; Cohen v. Hecht, 128 App. Div.
5II, 122 N. Y. S. 8o9 (i9o8); Feigenbaum v. Hizsnay, 187 App. Div. 126, 175
N. Y. S. 223 (I919). Because of the Act of April 28, 1903, P. L. 327, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided that an extension of time does not work as
an absolute release of the mortgagor as surety. Willock's Estate, 58 Pa. Super.
Ct., I59 (1914).

The Federal Courts have held that the general rule of an extension being
an absolute release, only applies to voluntary sureties. A paid surety is only
released to the extent and amount that the extension of time caused him injury. Guaranty Co. v. Presser Brick Co., 191 U. S. 416, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142,48
L. Ed. 242 (1903); U. S. v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 178 Fed. 721 (1910).
TRUSTS-INVESTMENT

IN STOCKS

AND

BONDS OF PRIVATE BUSINESS

CORPORATIONS 13Y A TRUSTEE.-A trustee invested trust funds in the preferred

stock of the Farrand Organ Company, a Michigan corporation. The corporation
failed and the investment resulted in a loss. Held: The trustee was not liable.
An investment by a trustee in the preferred stock of a private corporation may
be made under such circumstances as will relieve him from liability in case of loss.
In re Buhl's Estate, Walker v. Buhl, 178 N. W. 65I (Mich. 1920).
In England it was for many years the general rule that trust funds could
be invested in government securities only. Investments in the stock of corporations were not allowed unless expressly authorized by the instrument creating
the trust. Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. Jun. 15o (Eng. 1802); Hynes v.
Redington, r Jo. & Lat. 589 (Eng. 1844). This rule was followed so strictly that
Parliament finally interposed and, by the statutes of 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 35 and
23 & 24 Vict. ch. 38, authorized the investment of trust funds in the stock of the
Bank of England or of Ireland, or in mortgages upon freehold or copyhold estates.
The English rule has, in general, been followed in the United States but,
usually with less strictness. It has been held that, in the absence of statutory
authority or specific directions contained in the instrument creating the trust,
trust funds cannot be invested in the stocks or bonds of a private corporation
but should be invested in real estate or government securities. King v. Talbot,
4o N. Y. 76 (I869); Penn v. Folger, 182 Ill. 76, 55 N. E. 192 (1899); and that
investments in the stock of a private corporation are improper and made at the
trustee's peril. Tucker v. State, 72 Ind. 242 (i88o); even though persons who
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are generally considered men of prudence have made similar investments.
Worrell's Appeal, 23 Pa. 44 (1854). This rule has been modified by statutes
both in England and in the United States.
On the other hand, certain American states have followed a more liberal
rule. Since the case of Harvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830),
the Massachusetts court has consistently held that a trustee is not precluded
from investing the trust funds in the stock of a private corporation provided he
acts in good faith and exercises such sound discretion as men of prudence and
intelligence exercise in the permanent disposition of their own funds. This rule
was followed in the recent case of Kimball v. Whitney, 123 N. E. 665 (Mass.
i919), though the court admitted that the peculiar facts of that case made it
a very close one. The Massachusetts rule has been approved in other New England states. Kimball v. Reding, 31 N. H. 352 (1855); Peckham v. Newton,
15 R. I. 321 (1886); Scoville v. Brock, 8i Vt. 405, 7o Atl. 1014 (igo8); and is
similar to the rule which obtains in Maryland. McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md.
183 (1884).
A trust fund should of course be invested so as to yield an income, but the
security of the fund itself is of greater importance. The principal case recognizes this fundamental proposition but in it the court refuses to rule as a matter
of law that the safety of the trust fund can be insured only by limiting its investment to a particular class of securities. It follows the Massachusetts rule in
giving the trustee wide latitude as to the field of investment. At the same time,
however, the court discloses its intention thoroughly to investigate the circumstances under which such investments are made.
It has been suggested that the liberal rule was, at the time of its adoption,
necessitated by the paucity of government securities. Perry, Trusts & Trustees,
par. 456, 6 ed. I9iI. That reason no longer exists for there are now large quantities of government securities available. Since it is not to be denied that government securities are more permanent and safe than others, the strict early rule
would now seem to be preferable.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-GENERAL LEGACIES NOT CHARGE ON RESIDUARY

REAL ESTATE-The testatrix by will gave certain general legacies. Item "thirteen" then provided that if the personal estate was insufficient for the payment
of legacies "all or so much of my land at Spuyten Duyvil-as may be necessary" should be sold to produce funds to supply the deficiency. The residue
of the estate of "whatsoever character" was given in one mass to her nephews.
The personal estate was insufficient to pay the legacies and the proceeds from the
sale of the property under item "thirteen" of the will did not make up the deficiency. The executor under the will asked for a construction of it. Held:
The general legacies are not a charge on the residuary real estate, since in construing a will due effect must be given every provision therein, and item "thirteen" would be mere surplusage if the testatrix intended the legacies to be a
charge on the residuary real estate. Shannon v. Ryan, III Atl. 155 (N. J.
1920).

The primary fund for the payment of general legacies is the personal
estate of the testator, when the will contains no express direction that the real
estate shall be charged with them and when there is no gift of the residue of the
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real and personal estate blended in one mass. Pearson v. Wartman, 8o Md.
528, 31 Atl. 446 (1895). When there was a gift of "all the rest, residue and
remainder" of the estate in the will and no express direction charging the residuary real estate with payment of the legacies, the English Courts adopted an
absolute rule of construction that if the personal estate was insufficient to pay
the legacies given in the will, the residuary real estate was charged with payment
of them. The theory underlying this rule is that the whole property is one mass;
part of the mass is represented by legacies, and that what is afterwards given,
is given minus what has been given before, and therefore given subject to the
prior gift. Greville v. Browne, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 689, ii Eng. Rep. 275.
It is the general rule in the United States that when there is a residuary
devise of the whole estate, blending realty and personalty in one fund, such
blending implies an intention on the part of the testator to charge the general
pecuniary legacies on the residuary real estate, if the personal estate is insufficient to pay them, unless there is a contrary implication from other provisions
in the will. Corwine v. Corwine, 24 N. J. Eq. 579 (1874); Davis's Appeal, 83
Pa. 348 (1877); Gorman v. McDonnell, 127 Ala. 549, 8o So. 964 (I9oo); Williams
v. Williams, 189 Ill. 500, 59 N. E. 966 (igoi). In New York the blending of
realty and personalty alone is insufficient to charge the residuary realty with payment of the legacies, there must be extrinsic circumstances to show such was the
intention of the testator. Harvey v. Kennedy, 8I App. Div. 261 (N. Y. 19o3),
affirmed I77 N. Y. 533, 69 N. E. 1124 (I904); Irwin v. Teller, 188 N.Y. 25,
8o N. E. 76 (1907).
It is a fundamental rule in the construction of wills that due effect where
possible must be given to every provision contained therein; In re Lloyd's Estate,.
188 Pa. 45r, 41 Atl. 733 (1898); Canfield v. Canfield, ii8 Fed. I (1902); the
reason being that there is a presumption against intestacy when a testator makes
and publishes his will, English v. Cooper, 183 Ill. 203, 55 N. E. 687 (r899).
While recognizing the general opinion in relation to the blending of realty and
personalty in the residuary clause, the court in the principle case decides that
item "thirteen," under the rule of construction just given, shows an intention
on the part of the testatrix not to charge the residuary real estate with the payment of the legacies. But it will be noted that the rule is applied although the
reason for the rule is lacking, since there is no alternative of intestacy. It is
submitted that the rule should be disregarded in such a situation.

